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Uneven “Neutrality”: Dual Standards and the 
Establishment Clause in Johnson v. Poway 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“May a school district censor a high school teacher’s expression 
because it refers to Judeo-Christian views while allowing other 
teachers to express views on a number of controversial subjects, in-
cluding religion and anti-religion?”1 In 2010, a federal district court 
held that a school district may not.2 In 2011, the Ninth Circuit held 
otherwise.3 
The case that produced these contrary rulings, Johnson v. Poway 
Unified School District, involved a high school teacher’s claim that 
the school district he worked for had violated the Free Speech and 
Establishment Clauses of the First Amendment and the Equal Pro-
tection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The school district 
had ordered the teacher to remove two banners from his classroom 
wall because they contained references to God while allowing other 
teachers to exhibit noncurricular classroom displays, many of which 
featured religious themes and other potentially controversial subject 
matter. 
The Establishment Clause requires government neutrality toward 
religion,4 but the Ninth Circuit focused on potential problems with 
the teacher’s display and justifications for other similar displays. This 
resulted in content-based religious discrimination rather than the 
neutrality the Establishment Clause requires. For that reason, John-
son was wrongly decided and should be overturned. 
This Note will proceed as follows. Part II provides a brief over-
view of Establishment Clause jurisprudence as it relates to govern-
ment-sponsored religious displays. Part III summarizes Johnson v. 
Poway, including the facts of the case, the district court opinion, and 
the Ninth Circuit’s reversal. Part IV analyzes the Ninth Circuit’s de-
 
 1. Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., No. 07cv783 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 768856, 
at *1 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010) [hereinafter Johnson I]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See Johnson v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 658 F.3d 954, 957 (9th Cir. 2011) [he-
reinafter Johnson II]. 
 4. See infra note 7. 
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cision, discussing the similarities between two displays involved in 
the case, the different standards applied to each display, and how 
these dual standards brought about a discriminatory result. Part V 
concludes that the Ninth Circuit’s ruling is problematic because it 
potentially discriminates against specific religious viewpoints, thus 
violating the First Amendment. 
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AND RELIGIOUS DISPLAYS 
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment states that 
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of reli-
gion.”5 This clause applies to the states under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.6 Since the 1980s, the Supreme Court has interpreted 
the Establishment Clause to require religious neutrality rather than 
strict separation of church and state.7 Simply put, “government must 
not take sides between particular religions or denominations, or be-
tween belief or unbelief.”8 
Establishment Clause cases, which often involve challenges to 
government-sponsored religious displays, have been fairly inconsis-
tent9 because of the Supreme Court’s inability to articulate a test that 
yields fair and predictable results.10 In 1971, the Supreme Court at-
tempted to establish such a test.11 Under what has become known as 
the Lemon test, government actions touching on religion must 
1) “have a secular legislative purpose,” 2) have a “primary effect . . .  
 
 
 5. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 6. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). 
 7. Frederick Mark Gedicks, Undoing Neutrality? From Church-State Separation to Ju-
deo-Christian Tolerance, 46 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 691, 695 (2010). 
 8. Id. 
 9. See, e.g., Salazar v. Buono, 130 S. Ct. 1803, 1811 (2010) (permitting a legislative 
land transfer to a private party to preserve a previously enjoined Latin cross on federal land); 
McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005) (finding a display of the Ten Com-
mandments in a county courthouse unconstitutional); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 681 
(2005) (finding a display of the Ten Commandments on state capitol grounds constitutional); 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 579 (1989) (finding a nativity scene at the 
county courthouse unconstitutional and a menorah constitutional); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 
U.S. 668, 671–72 (1984) (finding a nativity scene constitutional as part of a municipal 
Christmas display). 
 10. See, e.g., RonNell Andersen Jones, Pick Your Poison: Private Speech, Government 
Speech, and the Special Problem of Religious Displays, 2010 BYU L. REV. 2045, 2045–46 
(2010). 
 11. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971). 
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that neither advances nor inhibits religion,” and 3) “not foster ‘an 
excessive government entanglement with religion.’”12 
Then, in a 1984 concurrence, Justice O’Connor proposed what 
has become known as the endorsement test,13 which the Court 
adopted as “the standard by which future religious display cases 
should be judged.”14 The endorsement test is essentially a modified 
Lemon test, combining the purpose and effect prongs and eliminat-
ing the entanglement prong.15 Under the endorsement test, a gov-
ernment-sponsored religious display violates the Establishment 
Clause if it “has the effect of endorsing religion”16—either because 
the government “subjectively intends to endorse or disapprove reli-
gion,” although its actions may not actually have that effect, or be-
cause government action is “reasonably understood to endorse or 
disapprove religion,” although such an effect may not have been in-
tended.17 
III. JOHNSON V. POWAY 
Although the dispute in Johnson v. Poway centers on religious dis-
plays, it is not a typical religious monument case. Rather than ad-
dressing a more blatant incident of government appropriation of re-
 
 12. Id. (citing Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)). The Lemon test 
has been criticized, sometimes vigorously. See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Like some ghoul in a late-
night horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeated-
ly killed and buried, Lemon stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again.”); Wal-
lace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 110 (1985) (“The three-part test has simply not provided ade-
quate standards for deciding Establishment Clause cases.”); Josh Blackman, This Lemon Comes 
as a Lemon: The Lemon Test and the Pursuit of a Statute’s Secular Purpose, 20 GEO. MASON U. 
C.R. L.J. 351, 357–58 (2010). Nevertheless, the Court continues to apply the test. See 
McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 859–65. Justice Scalia cynically suggests that the Lemon test owes 
its staying power to its usefulness in arriving at conclusions the Court prefers. See Lamb’s Cha-
pel, 508 U.S. at 399 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“When we wish to strike down a practice it for-
bids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely.”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
 13. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688–690 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring); 
Susanna Dokupil, “Thou Shalt Not Bear False Witness”: “Sham” Secular Purposes in Ten Com-
mandments Displays, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 609, 620–21 (2005). 
 14. Dokupil, supra note 13, at 621. See also Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 597. 
 15. 328 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 438 (2011). 
 16. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 595. 
 17. See FREDERICK MARK GEDICKS, THE RHETORIC OF CHURCH AND STATE 73 
(1995). 
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ligious symbols,18 such as a municipality displaying a nativity,19 John-
son concerns a school district’s decision to prevent a high school 
math teacher from maintaining a display on his classroom walls de-
spite a district-wide policy of allowing teachers to display non-
curricular messages of their choice. 
A. Factual Background 
The plaintiff, Bradley Johnson, was a high school math teacher 
and faculty sponsor of a student Christian club20 and had taught in 
the Poway School District in San Diego, California, since 1977.21 
Five years after he began teaching, Johnson hung a red, white, and 
blue banner on his classroom wall that measured seven feet by two 
feet and featured four phrases: “In God We Trust,” “One Nation 
Under God,” “God Bless America,” and “God Shed His Grace On 
Thee.”22 Eight years later, Johnson hung a second banner—similar 
to the first in size and appearance—that contained the following 
quote from the Declaration of Independence: “All Men Are Created 
Equal, They Are Endowed By Their Creator.”23 On this second ban-
ner, the word creator was given its own line, on which it was printed 
in capital letters approximately twice the size of the other text.24 
Johnson placed both banners in his classroom in accordance with 
the school district’s policy of allowing teachers “to display on their 
classroom walls messages and other items that reflect the teacher’s 
personality, opinions, and values, as well as political and social con-
cerns . . . so long as the wall display does not materially disrupt 
school work or cause substantial disorder or interference in the class-
room.”25 Under this policy, teachers throughout the district used 
their classroom walls to display posters, banners, bumper stickers and 
 
 18. See Gedicks, supra note 7, at 696. 
 19. See McCreary Cnty. v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677, 681 (2005). 
 20. See Johnson II, 658 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 21. Id.; HS Teacher Told to Remove ‘God’ Banners by Federal Court, 10NEWS.COM 
(Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.10news.com/news/29181371/detail.html. 
 22. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958; Johnson I, No. 07cv783 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 
768856, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2010). 
 23. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *2. 
 24. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958. 
 25. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *9. 
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other items with cultural, political, and religious messages.26 In this 
environment, Johnson displayed his banners “in some form or 
another” without objection until 2006.27 
Johnson began teaching at a new high school within the district 
in 2003.28 In 2006, a colleague asked the school principal about the 
banners in Johnson’s classroom.29 The principal visited Johnson’s 
classroom, where she saw the banners, apparently for the first time, 
and was “surprised” and “overwhelmed” by what she saw.30 She later 
testified that while the phrases on Johnson’s banners were “not 
problematic at all” when read alone or in context, she was concerned 
that Johnson’s presentation promoted a religious viewpoint that 
might make some students uncomfortable.31 
The principal consulted with the assistant superintendent, who 
investigated the banners and reported to the school board.32 The 
school board ordered Johnson to remove the banners because the 
phrases they displayed had a “combined influence that ‘over-
emphasized’ God.”33 The principal suggested that Johnson modify 
his display by providing additional context (for example, by display-
ing the entire Declaration of Independence rather than just the parts 
that refer to God).34 Johnson refused,35 and in January 2007, the as-
sistant superintendent ordered Johnson to remove the banners.36 
Johnson complied with the orders.37 
 
 26. Id. at *3–4 (providing an extensive list of displays found on teachers’ walls through-
out the school district, including the following displays with explicitly or arguably religious 
elements: Tibetan prayer flags, a John Lennon poster with lyrics to the song “Imagine,” a 
poster of Mahatma Gandhi (a “Hindu leader”) and a poster of Gandhi’s “7 Social Sins,” a 
poster of the Dali Lama (a “Buddhist leader”), a poster referring to hell, and a poster of Mal-
colm X (a “Muslim minister”)). 
 27. See id. at *4; Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 959. 
 28. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958. 
 29. Id. The district court opinion implies that the colleague had hostile motives, noting 
that he “may have disagreed with Johnson over pedagogy.” See Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, 
at *4. 
 30. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *4. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958–59. 
 35. Id. at 959. 
 36. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *4–5. 
 37. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 959. 
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B. The District Court Opinion 
After removing his banners, Johnson sued the school district in 
federal court,38 claiming violations of the Constitution’s Free Speech 
Clause,39 Establishment Clause,40 and Equal Protection Clause,41 as 
well as corresponding sections of the California state constitution.42 
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Johnson on 
all claims. 
In its opinion, the district court concentrated primarily on John-
son’s free speech claims.43 Focusing on the school district’s policy of 
allowing teachers to “express ideas on their classroom walls,” the 
court held that the district’s policy had created a “limited public fo-
rum.”44 Therefore, only “viewpoint neutral” regulation of speech 
was permissible.45 Noting that the school district allowed other 
teachers to use their classroom walls to express opinions “on a wide 
variety of secular and religious topics,”46 the court concluded that 
the school district had “singled out [Johnson’s speech] for suppres-
sion because of its [Judeo-Christian] message,” thereby violating 
Johnson’s First Amendment right to free speech.47 
Regarding Johnson’s Establishment Clause claim, the district 
court held that the school district’s policies were “not neutral toward 
teachers’ religious displays.”48 Specifically, the school district had vi-
olated the Establishment Clause through the “endorsement of 
Buddhist, Hindu, and anti-religious speech by some teachers while 
silencing the Judeo-Christian speech of Johnson.”49 
Finally, the court held that the school district violated Johnson’s 
rights to equal protection by limiting his speech “based on the con-
tent and viewpoint of what he was expressing—while at the same 
 
 38. Id. 
 39. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *5. 
 40. Id. at *5, *18. 
 41. Id. at *5, *20. 
 42. Id. at *5. 
 43. See id. at *5–18. 
 44. Id. at *9. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at *10. Other teachers hung banners and posters involving Buddhism, Hin-
duism, and “anti-religious speech.” Id. 
 47. Id. at *10–11. 
 48. Id. at *19. 
 49. Id. 
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time permitting other teacher speech from a variety of other view-
points . . . .”50 
C. The Ninth Circuit’s Reversal 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court on all 
points.51 First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that because Johnson’s 
claim involved a government restriction on speech by a government 
employee, the district court incorrectly applied a “forum-based anal-
ysis.”52 Instead, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Johnson’s claim 
failed because he “spoke as an employee, not as a citizen.”53 Because 
Johnson spoke as an employee, his speech was government speech 
rather than private speech. Consequently, because the First Amend-
ment does not restrict government regulation of government speech, 
the court held that the school district “acted well within constitu-
tional limits in ordering Johnson not to speak in a manner it did not 
desire.”54 
The court then considered Johnson’s claims under the Estab-
lishment Clause, which, unlike the Free Speech Clause, does apply to 
government speech.55 The court treated Johnson’s claim as two re-
lated claims: first, that the school district had allegedly shown hostili-
ty to Judeo-Christian beliefs by ordering Johnson to remove his 
banners, and second, that the school district had supposedly en-
dorsed other religious beliefs by allowing other teachers to maintain 
 
 50. Id. at *21. 
 51. Johnson II, 658 F.3d 954, 958 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 52. Id. at 961. 
 53. Id. at 964. The Ninth Circuit based its conclusion on a five-step Pickering analysis: 
 
 (1) whether the plaintiff spoke on a matter of public concern; (2) whether the 
plaintiff spoke as a private citizen or public employee; (3) whether the plaintiff’s 
protected speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the adverse employ-
ment action; (4) whether the state had an adequate justification for treating the 
employee differently from other members of the general public; and (5) whether 
the state would have taken the adverse employment action even absent the pro-
tected speech.  
 
Id. at 961 (quoting Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1070 (9th Cir. 2009)). However, having 
concluded that Johnson spoke as a public employee, the court ended the analysis without ad-
dressing the final three factors. Id. at 964. 
 54. Id. at 970. 
 55. Id. 
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their displays.56 Examining each claim separately, the court con-
cluded that the school district had not violated the Establishment 
Clause.57 
First, the court concluded that the school district did not violate 
the Establishment Clause by ordering the removal of Johnson’s ban-
ners because, as government speech, the banners “would raise at 
least the possibility of an Establishment Clause claim” against the 
school.58 By removing the banners, the school district was pursuing a 
valid secular purpose of avoiding Establishment Clause violations and 
maintaining religious neutrality.59 
Second, the Court concluded that the other displays with reli-
gious elements merely had “some religious connotation.”60 Because 
the other displays were not used to “endorse or inhibit religion,” the 
district did not violate the Establishment Clause by permitting 
them.61 
Regarding Johnson’s equal protection claim, the court held that 
“[b]ecause Johnson had no individual right to speak for the govern-
ment,” he had no claim.62 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit determined 
that none of Johnson’s constitutional claims succeeded. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
The correctness of the Ninth Circuit’s holding that there was no 
Free Speech Clause issue because Johnson’s banners were govern-
ment speech is beyond the scope of this Note.63 But even accepting 
the court’s Free Speech Clause conclusion as correct, Johnson was 
 
 56. Id. at 971. 
 57. Id. at 974. 
 58. Id. at 973. 
 59. See id. at 971. 
 60. Id. at 973. 
 61. The Court specifically mentioned posters of Gandhi, the Dalai Lama, and Malcolm 
X; a poster with the lyrics to John Lennon’s song “Imagine”; and a string of Tibetan prayer 
flags. Id.  
 62. Id. at 975. 
 63. At least one First Amendment scholar disagrees with the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion. 
See Eugene Volokh, A Rare First Amendment Victory for a Public School Teacher Complaining 
About Restrictions on In-School Speech, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Feb. 26, 2010, 6:39 PM), 
http://volokh.com/2010/02/26/a-rare-first-amendment-victory-for-a-public-school-
teacher-complaining-about-restrictions-on-in-school-speech (“[T]he highly unusual policy of 
the school district . . . probably does create a designated public forum for the teachers’ own 
messages.”). The court’s holding on Johnson’s equal protection claim rests on the Free Speech 
Clause conclusion. 
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decided incorrectly. Johnson should have prevailed on the strength 
of his religious discrimination claim. By ordering Johnson to remove 
his banners from his classroom while allowing other teachers to 
maintain their displays, Poway School District violated the Estab-
lishment Clause of the First Amendment. 
The issue in Johnson was not the constitutionality of either John-
son’s display or the displays of other teachers. Rather, it was the con-
stitutionality of Poway School District’s treatment of these displays. 
The Ninth Circuit erroneously divided Johnson’s Establishment 
Clause claim into two separate claims and ignored the combined ef-
fect of Poway School District’s actions. Instead, the court applied 
one standard to Johnson’s banners and another standard to other 
displays throughout the school district, thus failing to enforce the 
ideal of neutrality that the Establishment Clause requires. Had the 
Ninth Circuit applied the same standard to the school district’s 
treatment of all of the exhibits, the result would have been uniform 
and constitutional. Instead, the court applied different standards 
which produced inconsistent results that a reasonable observer could 
interpret as hostility to one religion and preference to others. This 
renders the school district’s actions unconstitutional regardless of 
whether the district intended that effect. 
To best illustrate the court’s error, this section will focus on the 
court’s treatment of two displays: Johnson’s banners and the Tibetan 
prayer flags. Part A describes the similarities between the two dis-
plays, reinforcing the conclusion that the court had no reason for 
judging the two displays by different standards. Part B argues that 
the prayer flags raised the same potential threat of an Establishment 
Clause violation that Johnson’s banners did. Part C argues that 
Johnson’s banners were no more coercive than the prayer flags. 
A. Comparing Classroom Displays 
The Ninth Circuit concluded that Johnson’s banners plainly 
conveyed a religious message.64 In contrast, “an objective observer 
could [not] conclude that the [prayer] flags were displayed for a reli-
gious purpose.”65 However, the distinction between the two displays  
 
 
 64. See Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 965. 
 65. Id. at 974. 
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was negligible66 because both displays contained plainly religious 
elements and both had plausible secular reasons for their displays. 
Johnson’s banners undeniably contained religious elements—
they explicitly referred to God five times. But references to God do 
not change the fact that the text has secular origins.67 The religious 
elements of Johnson’s banners do not invalidate Johnson’s claim that 
the banners are patriotic and “highlight the religious heritage and 
nature of our nation.”68 
The teacher who displayed the prayer flags testified that the flags 
were associated with climbing Mount Everest and represented “ac-
complishing ‘an amazing goal.’”69 But her use of the flags to “stimu-
late the interest of her students” when discussing fossils near Mount 
Everest70 does not change the fact that the prayer flags are religious 
artifacts:71 Tibetan prayer flags are physical manifestations of pray-
ers,72 and the flags on display in the classroom are printed with im-
ages of Buddha.73 
One important difference between the two displays is that one 
represents a majority religion and the other a minority religion. But 
this difference does not warrant judicial application of different stan-
dards to evaluate their permissibility under the Establishment Clause. 
 
 66. The most obvious similarities between the displays are physical. See Johnson I, No. 
07cv783 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 768856, at *18. Johnson’s banners and the prayer flags are 
both large and prominently displayed in their respective classrooms. Johnson’s two banners 
each measure approximately seven feet by two feet and hung on the walls of Johnson’s class-
room. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 958. The string of Tibetan prayer flags “span[ned] the 35–40 
foot width of a classroom.” Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *10. 
 67. Id. at *2 (noting that Johnson’s first banner features “famous national phrases” and 
that “[t]he second banner quotes from the Declaration of Independence”). 
 68. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 960. 
 69. Id. at 974. 
 70. Id. at 973–74. 
 71. See Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856, at *19. 
 72. Donald S. Lopez, Jr., A Prayer Flag for Tara, in RELIGIONS OF TIBET IN PRACTICE 
548 (Donald S. Lopez, Jr. ed., 1997) (“The wind is said to carry the benefits beseeched by the 
prayer imprinted on the fluttering flag, both to the person who flies the flag and to all beings 
in the region.”). 
 73. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856 at *3. One could argue that most students would not 
recognize the flags as prayer flags and therefore would not consider them religious displays, 
One could just as easily argue that most students would recognize the historical context of the 
statements on Johnson’s banners and therefore not consider the banners religious displays. 
Furthermore, it seems likely that even if the typical American teenager would not recognize the 
prayer flags as religious relics, he or she would recognize the images of Buddha as religious 
symbols. 
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Establishment of a minority religion is no more constitutional than 
establishment of a majority religion.74  
B. Removing Displays as an Act of Hostility 
The Ninth Circuit incorrectly rejected the argument that the 
school district’s removal of Johnson’s banners conveyed hostility to-
ward Christianity. Viewed in isolation, the removal of the banners 
does not convey hostility. But by permitting other teachers to main-
tain exhibits featuring other religious traditions, the school district’s 
actions have the appearance of singling out Christianity for negative 
treatment.  
 Addressing Johnson’s claim, the Ninth Circuit held that Poway’s 
order to remove Johnson’s banners satisfied the Lemon test and thus 
did not violate the Establishment Clause.75 First, the court identified 
Johnson’s banners as a potential violation of the Establishment 
Clause and held that the school district therefore had a valid secular 
purpose in ordering their removal.76 Next, the court reasoned that by 
attempting to avoid Establishment Clause claims, the school district 
was “maintain[ing] the very neutrality the Clause requires . . . .” 
Therefore, the school district’s action “neither has a primary effect of 
advancing or inhibiting religion nor excessively entangles govern-
ment with religion.”77 
The question of whether Poway School District violated the Es-
tablishment Clause by removing Johnson’s banners depends on if the 
school district risked a potential Establishment Clause claim by al-
lowing Johnson’s banners to remain. The court held that it did, but 
did not explain how it arrived at this conclusion.78 The court noted 
only that the phrases on Johnson’s banners, “as organized and dis-
played . . . convey[ed] a religious message,”79 and that government 
speech regarding religion violates the Establishment Clause only 
when it “turns stigmatic or coercive.”80 Because the Ninth Circuit of-
fers no additional clarification, it appears—whether this is the case or 
 
 74. See infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
 75. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 972. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 973. 
 79. Id. at 965. 
 80. Id. at 972. 
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not—that the court found Johnson’s banners to be “stigmatic or 
coercive” simply because they were calculated to “convey a religious 
message.”81 
Under this standard, the Tibetan prayer flags also raise a poten-
tial Establishment Clause issue. Unlike Johnson’s banners, prayer 
flags do not present secular material in a way that conveys a religious 
message. Rather, they present religious material displayed for a secu-
lar purpose.82 But Establishment Clause jurisprudence suggests that 
“any display of an overtly religious symbol, such as the Ten Com-
mandments or a Latin cross, seems to trigger the suspicion that the 
purpose is not secular.”83 Although the public may not equate Tibe-
tan prayer flags with religious symbols as they would the Ten Com-
mandments or a cross, it seems reasonable to conclude that a typical 
high school student would recognize the images of Buddha on the 
flag as religious symbols. And while the symbols may be those of a 
minority religion, there is no reason to think that such a display can-
not convey a religious message and violate the Establishment 
Clause.84 
The Ninth Circuit cited its decision in Vasquez v. Los Angeles 
County85 to support the conclusion that Poway did not violate the 
Establishment Clause by ordering the removal of Johnson’s ban-
ners.86 However, Vasquez does not necessarily support the removal of 
the banners. In that case, a city employee argued that Los Angeles 
showed hostility to Christianity by removing an image of a cross, said 
to represent the California missions, from its city seal.87 Although the 
court in Vasquez upheld the removal of the cross from the seal, it did 
not address what would happen if the city had removed one religious 
symbol while allowing other religious symbols to remain.88 The 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. The secular purpose in this instance—“to stimulate scientific interest,” id. at 974—
more closely resembles the secular purpose of Johnson’s display than it does a clearly valid se-
cular purpose such as the use of the Bible in an English literature class. See Illinois ex rel. 
McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 236 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 83. Dokupil, supra note 13, at 630. 
 84. See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 634 (1989) (O’Connor, J., con-
curring) (rejecting the contention “that it would be implausible for the city to endorse a faith 
adhered to by a minority of the citizenry”). 
 85. 487 F.3d 1246 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 86. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 970–71. 
 87. Vasquez, 487 F.3d at 1247–48. 
 88. See id. at 1248. 
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Ninth Circuit correctly relied on Vasquez to conclude that removal 
of a religious symbol is not a per se demonstration of hostility to re-
ligion. However, the court failed to take the necessary step of ad-
dressing the facts in Johnson, in which the government removed 
symbols of one religion while allowing symbols of other religions to 
remain. Specifically, the court failed to recognize that a reasonable 
observer would likely conclude that this selective removal of one re-
ligious symbol is an act of hostility.  
C. Permitting Displays as an Act of Endorsement 
The Ninth Circuit also failed to consider that allowing other reli-
gious exhibits to remain would likely be interpreted as an unconsti-
tutional endorsement of religion. The court began its response to 
Johnson’s claim that the district had endorsed other religions by al-
lowing other teachers to maintain their religious and antireligious 
messages89 by stating that “[s]imply having religious content or 
promoting a message consistent with a religious doctrine does not 
run afoul of the Establishment Clause.”90 Although the court con-
ceded that many displays throughout the school district, including 
the prayer flags, “have some religious connotation,”91 it was quick to 
assert that there was no indication that these displays were “used to 
endorse or inhibit religion.”92 
To arrive at this conclusion regarding the prayer flags, the court 
noted that (1) the teacher who displayed the flags claimed to be un-
aware of their religious meaning, (2) none of the teacher’s students 
had ever identified the flags as religious, and (3) the teacher had a 
secular purpose for displaying the flags.93 Based on these facts, the 
court held that “[t]hough the flags may . . . represent the Buddhist 
faith, their use by the school district has nothing to do with their re-
ligious connotation. Instead, the evidence in this case demonstrates 
that the school district uses the flags to stimulate interest in science 
and scientific discovery without any mention of religion.”94 The 
 
 89. For a list of these other displays, see supra note 25 and accompanying text. 
 90. Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 973 (alteration in original) (quoting Johnson I, No. 
07cv783 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 768856, at *6 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2010) (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. at 974. 
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court reasoned that the context of the display further supported this 
conclusion by neutralizing any religious message.95 
Of course, Johnson’s display is permissible under similar reason-
ing. Johnson knew that his banners had religious significance;96 how-
ever, the court explicitly stated that a teacher’s intent was not dispo-
sitive.97 Neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit indicated 
that any of Johnson’s students had identified the banners as reli-
gious. (In fact, the record states that Johnson displayed his banners 
for twenty years with no complaints.)98 Any coercive effect that the 
banners may have had on students is purely speculative. 
Additionally, Johnson had a secular purpose for displaying his 
banners.99 The context of the statements on Johnson’s display pro-
vides further evidence of their secular purpose. Students exposed to 
Johnson’s banners would almost certainly be aware of the secular 
origins of their text: even a student who did not know the statements 
could be found in the Declaration of Independence, on currency, or 
in well-known patriotic songs could not possibly ignore the fact that 
one of the phrases was taken from the Pledge of Allegiance, which 
the school’s students recite every day.100 It seems inconsistent to 
claim that the words “under God” are not coercive when the school 
directs the students to recite them,101 and yet they become coercive 
when hung silently on a classroom wall. And, as the district court 
noted, any potential coercion behind Johnson’s banner would be 
further offset by “the cacophony of other First Amendment speech 
which remains in the high school classrooms.”102 
Just as it correctly held that Poway School District could order 
the removal of Johnson’s banners without violating the Establish-
 
 95. Id. 
 96. See id. at 959. 
 97. See id. at 974 (“[B]ecause the speech is the government’s, Brickley’s purpose is not 
dispositive.”). 
 98. Johnson I, No. 07cv783 BEN (NLS), 2010 WL 768856, at *17 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 
2010). 
 99. See Johnson II, 658 F.3d at 959. 
 100. POWAY UNIFIED SCH. DIST., ANNUAL NOTIFICATION OF PARENTS’/STUDENTS’ 
RIGHTS 3 (2010), available at http://www.powayusd.com/enrollment/10-11FORMS/ 
English/Annual_Notification_%20ParentStuRights_ENG_10_11Final.pdf. 
 101. Although district policy allows students to opt out of reciting the Pledge, those who 
do so will still likely hear the offending words every morning. See id. 
 102. Johnson I, 2010 WL 768856 at *13. 
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ment Clause,103 the court correctly held that the school district could 
allow the prayer flags and other displays to remain in classrooms 
without violating the clause. However, the court failed to address the 
reasons for allowing these displays to remain while at the same time 
ordering the removal of Johnson’s banners. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By itself, the Ninth Circuit’s holding that Poway School District 
was justified in removing Johnson’s banners is not problematic. Nei-
ther is the court’s holding that the prayer flags and other displays 
were permissible. But considered together, the two holdings raise se-
rious concerns of religious discrimination. A reasonable observer 
could certainly interpret these actions as displaying hostility to John-
son’s Christian message while endorsing other religious messages, 
even if the school district did not intend such an effect.104 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision to allow Poway to selectively permit 
religious displays is not unprecedented.105 But the relevant decision 
was clearly based on key distinctions between the physical settings of 
the displays rather than their underlying messages.106 In Johnson, 
there were no such distinctions—both the banners and the prayer 
flags were similarly displayed and in similar settings.107 
Currently, the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence does not provide 
clear standards for lower courts to apply in religious display cases.108 
But the Court has unambiguously required government neutrality in 
matters of religion.109 In future cases, a court could reasonably in-
terpret Supreme Court precedent to allow either a restrictive or a 
permissive approach to these cases. But whichever approach a court 
chooses, the neutrality standard requires that the court apply the 
same standard to all displays that it considers. In Johnson, the Ninth  
 
 
 103. See supra Part IV.B. 
 104. See supra note 17 and accompanying text. 
 105. In County of Allegheny v. ACLU, the Supreme Court upheld the display of an eigh-
teen-foot menorah while finding a nativity scene unconstitutional. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 106. The menorah was displayed outside and next to a forty-five-foot Christmas tree; in 
contrast, the nativity scene was displayed alone and in a prominent location inside the court-
house. Id. at 580–82. 
 107. See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text. 
 108. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 109. Board of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 696 (1994). 
DO NOT DELETE 3/20/2012 11:56 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
558 
Circuit failed to do so; therefore, Johnson was wrongly decided and 
should be overruled. 
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